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Saving a Piece of the Rock: 
The State of Iowa 
and the Railroad Problem, 1972–1984 
GREGORY L. SCHNEIDER 
A TRIP ON THE ROCK ISLAND branch line near Iowa Falls 
in May 1975 dramatized the issues plaguing the newly bankrupt 
railroad. Near Rodman, steel track was stamped with the date 
1904, much of it consisting of light 60-pound rail nearly three-
quarters of a century old. Such track may have been suitable for 
the demands of shipping grain on branches through the 1950s, 
when most grain was hauled in boxcars, but the development of 
heavier jumbo hopper cars (which weighed 263,000 pounds 
when fully loaded) employed on branch lines by the 1970s neces-
sitated regular maintenance and heavier rail. A train on the line 
averaged only ten miles per hour, “rocking and rolling” over un-
even track. It was little wonder that derailments were common, 
slowing shipments of grain out of the rich farm fields and coop-
erative elevators in northwestern Iowa. The federal government 
had refused assistance to repair the track, leaving the state of 
Iowa to create an innovative program to do so. But worry about 
the survival of not only the railroad but of small farm communi-
ties led one shipper at Dows, Iowa, to state, “If you lose the rail-
road the elevator will go out of business and the town will die.”1 
 The story of bad track and slow orders was not uncommon 
on railroads during the 1970s, for the entire American railroad 
1. Dan Piller, “Trip Dramatizes Rock Island’s Woes,” Des Moines Register, 5/18/ 
1975. 
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industry was in crisis. For well over a decade, railroads had suf-
fered from decreased investment. Their rate of return on equity 
was a dismal 4 percent during the 1950s; it would sink further to 
about 2 percent in the 1970s.2 Many railroads were becoming less 
and less able to attract private investment capital. As a con-
sequence, railroad companies deferred maintenance on track, 
roadbed, structures, and equipment. During the 1960s, railroads 
had sought to abandon passenger trains at a record pace. When 
they were not permitted to do so, railroads provided such bad 
service on unprofitable trains that they drove away the few re-
maining passengers. By the time Amtrak was formed in 1971, 
railroad passengers had declined to about 4 percent of the trav-
eling public from 29 percent a decade earlier. Railroads also saw 
their working capital decline precipitously, giving rise to the 
post–World War II “railroad problem,” which Senator George 
Smathers (D-FL) diagnosed in Senate hearings in 1958: “A mighty 
industry has come upon sick and precarious times.”3 A spate of 
bankruptcies in the Northeast, led by the Penn Central Transpor-
tation Company, forced the federal government to bail out the 
northeastern roads with the creation of Conrail in 1976. Yet no 
federal bailout was looming for troubled lines in the Midwest 
during the decade. 
 The major hindrance to railroad profitability during the post–
World War II period was continued regulation of rates and ser-
vice by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC may 
have once been a necessity in the late nineteenth century in or-
der to prevent abuses and restore order to an anarchic rate sys-
tem in the railroad industry. By the 1950s, however, the railroads 
were no longer a monopoly; rather, they competed for traffic 
with trucks rolling on highways constructed by the government. 
Likewise, barges were delivering corn and grain to Gulf of Mex-
ico ports on waterways dredged and maintained by the govern-
ment, and airlines were stealing passenger traffic at government-
subsidized airports, where airlines paid no taxes (unlike passenger 
2. For the figure in 1970, see The American Railroad Industry: A Prospectus (Wash-
ington, DC, 1970), 4, generally known as the ASTRO Report, in Judith R. Hope 
Files (Domestic Council), box 42 (Union Pacific), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Li-
brary, Ann Arbor, MI. 
3. Ibid. 
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train depots, which were subject to property taxes). The automo-
bile took passengers away from railroads on a federally funded 
highway system that put the final nail in the coffin of passenger 
trains. All of the changes necessitated some alteration of a regu-
latory structure that was impeding railroad profitability and the 
industry’s ability to compete in delivering transportation services.4 
 No state was more symptomatic of “the railroad problem” in 
the United States during the 1970s than Iowa. In the peak years 
of railroad mileage in the early twentieth century, 10,500 miles of 
railroad crisscrossed the state; by 1974, that number had decreased 
to 6,500. The bankruptcies of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific 
Railroad (Rock Island) in 1975 and the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. 
Paul and Pacific Railroad (Milwaukee Road) in 1977 further re-
duced railroad lines to 3,400 miles. Today, the state possesses less 
than one-third of the railroad mileage it had at the dawn of the 
twentieth century.5 Even by the mid–twentieth century, Iowa’s 
rail mileage, constructed during a time before trucks and high-
ways linked agricultural shippers to the ports and urban areas of 
the nation, far exceeded its need. But by the 1970s, it was clear 
that much of Iowa’s rail network was no longer needed, and 
abandonment of branch lines led many experts to fear that only 
a few major lines would remain in the state.  
 The bankruptcy and feared liquidation of the Penn Central 
helped spur proposed federal solutions to the railroad problem. 
Congress and the Nixon administration created the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) in 1971 to remove the 
burden of intercity passenger service from the private railroads. 
To rehabilitate the bankrupt northeastern lines, particularly the 
Penn Central, Congress passed the Regional Rail Reorganization 
(3R) Act in 1973, leading to the establishment of the U.S. Railroad 
4. For a concise summary of the federal government’s regulatory policies re-
garding railroads, airlines, and trucks, see Mark H. Rose, Bruce E. Seely, and 
Paul F. Barrett, The Best Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Air-
lines, and American Public Policy in the Twentieth Century (Columbus, OH, 2006). 
5. See Iowa Rail History at the Iowa Department of Transportation website: 
www.iowadot.gov/iowarail/history/history.htm (accessed 7/25/2012). The 
best history of Iowa railroads from the beginning to the 1990s is Don L. Hof-
sommer, Steel Trails of Hawkeyeland: Iowa’s Railroad Experience (Bloomington, IN, 
2005). 
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Administration (USRA). The USRA was given the task of devel-
oping a Final System Plan for the bankrupt eastern lines, which 
swelled to seven railroads by 1975. In early 1976 Gerald Ford 
signed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) 
Act into law, implementing the recommendations of the USRA to 
create the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) and allowing 
for borrowing to rehabilitate railroads in the East and Midwest. 
Exactly where Iowa’s place was in this developing nationalization 
Abandoned depot, Rockford, Iowa (September 1982), 
dwarfed by two adjoining elevators. Rockford once 
loomed large in eastern Iowa railroading. Between 
1883 and 1913, the town was a division terminal 
with a roundhouse, coal chute, water station, and 
ice house. The two-story depot is all that remains 
today, but it has been preserved and restored on its 
original site by the Rockford Historical Society. All 
photos taken by and courtesy of James Beranek. 
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of rail lines was a prominent concern for state officials through-
out the 1970s.6  
 How did Iowa policymakers respond to the railroad crisis in 
the state? How did they try to prevent the decline of the private 
rail network and work with railroads like the Rock Island to pro-
vide help to maintain service to dependent shippers in the state? 
Fearful of losing service on rail lines throughout the state, Iowa 
policymakers aided the Rock Island (and other railroads) in or-
der to provide support for rehabilitating branch lines in the state. 
These efforts to “save a piece of the Rock” paid dividends for 
Iowa shippers after the venerable line was liquidated in the 1980s 
because a majority of the property in the state was saved for use 
by other railroads. The state’s efforts reveal a rare instance of 
government-business cooperation that helped preserve service 
in some areas and allowed for other companies to benefit once 
the Rock Island was gone. 
 
THE EFFORT to save the railroad network in the state began 
over the issue of energy, particularly shortages of fertilizer and fuel 
because of the oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the fall of 1973. “The combination 
of a wet corn crop and a late harvest in the fall of 1972 that first 
alerted Iowans to an energy shortage” led the Iowa General As-
sembly and the administration of Republican Governor Robert 
Ray to establish the Iowa Energy Policy Council “to plan and to 
coordinate Iowa’s energy efforts.”7 The council, made up of nine 
representatives from the General Assembly and the private sec-
tor, soon discovered that the ties between energy policy and 
transportation—particularly the growing problem of serving 
6. The railroad problem was also a prominent concern of newspapers in the 
state, including the Des Moines Register. One issue of concern to Iowans was the 
proposed Amtrak route through Iowa, which employed the Burlington North-
ern mainline from Burlington in the southeast part of the state to Council Bluffs 
in the west, bypassing the state’s largest cities and university towns. A second 
train, running on the Santa Fe Railroad, skirted the southeast edge of Iowa, 
crossing the Mississippi River at Fort Madison. See, for example, Des Moines 
Register, 12/22/1970, 1/8/1971, 1/23/1971, 1/29/1971, 4/1/1971, and  4/19/1971. 
7. “Iowa Statement on Project Independence,” 9/11/1974, Energy Policy Coun-
cil, Departmental and Subject Files (Vermeer), 1969–1983, Robert Ray Papers, 
RG 43 Governor, State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines.  
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rural grain elevators—demanded governmental action to deter-
mine the best way to employ energy resources in the state.8 
 Recognizing the importance of railroad transportation in the 
state for conserving energy, the Energy Policy Council lobbied 
hard to secure funding to rehabilitate railroad lines. “The rail-
roads are potentially the most energy efficient carrier of goods on 
long-distance, inland trips. The deterioration of rail service in 
Iowa, as in other states, shows the price being paid for the na-
tion’s failure to have an energy-related transportation policy.”9 
Discussion among council members centered on rehabilitating 
branch lines, many of which were in deplorable condition. As a 
commemorative pamphlet described the situation, “Deferred 
maintenance, inefficient use of freight cars and the inability 
of some carriers to cope with the increased shipping brought 
about as a result of the Russian Grain deal, finally took its toll on 
Iowa’s rail system.”10  
 In 1974 the Iowa General Assembly created the Rail Assis-
tance Program, to be administered by the Iowa Department of 
Transportation (IDOT). Program staff identified seven branch 
lines as candidates for state assistance, including two on the Rock 
Island: the branch from Indianola to Carlisle and the 120-mile 
Iowa Falls gateway in northwestern Iowa. Ideally, the railroad 
company was to perform the rehabilitation work on the line, with 
expenses shared equally by the state, the railroad, and participat-
ing shippers. Railroads would receive interest-free loans from 
the state and shippers to cover the costs of rehabilitation, with 
funds to be repaid based on the number of carloads shipped over 
the branch. The initial appropriation for the Rail Assistance Pro-
gram was $3 million, far less than the state spent on its road net-
work. Nonetheless, by 1982 the program had written 29 contracts 
to upgrade track on 17 branch lines totaling 1,191 miles at a cost 
of $79 million.11 
8. The nine members of the Energy Policy Council were Harriette Baum, James 
Fuller, Harriett Lindberg, Orren Olson, Robert Porter, Senator James Gallagher 
(D-Vail), Senator Calvin Hultman (R-Waterloo), Representative Gregory Cu-
sack (D-Davenport), and Representative Brice Oakley (R-Burlington).  
9. “Iowa Statement on Project Independence.” 
10. “Iowa Rail Assistance Program,” folder 9 (DOT, 1982), box 238, Ray Papers. 
11. Ibid., 2–3. 
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THE ROCK ISLAND desperately needed the state funds. By 
1974, the railroad had reached an endgame in its long-sought 
merger with the Union Pacific Railroad (UP). The ICC had ap-
proved the merger of the two properties (subject to stringent con-
ditions imposed on both properties that would have, in effect, 
redrawn the western railroad map), but by the time the decision 
was announced in November 1974 the UP no longer wanted the 
Rock Island, whose infrastructure and track had decayed during 
the decade-long merger proceeding.12 In anticipation of federal 
funding being available for reconstructive aid to railroads in the 
12. Gregory L. Schneider, Rock Island Requiem: The Collapse of a Mighty Fine Line 
(Lawrence, KS, 2013), documents the merger fiasco and the battle within the 
railroad industry over the Rock Island. 
 
Abandoned track, Elmira, Iowa (June 1981). Located 9.4 miles northeast of 
Iowa City, Elmira was a busy junction—but never a town—that boasted a 
depot, freight house, two water tanks, and up to 60 passenger and freight 
trains per day in 1898. Fifteen months after the Rock Island closed in 
March 1980, all that was left were the Burlington–Minneapolis main track, 
a weedy passing siding, and a switch-stand and station sign well used for 
target practice by hunters. 
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Midwest as a consequence of the passage of the Regional Rail Re-
organization (3R) Act in 1973, the Rock Island applied for a $100 
million loan from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), 
with backing from Iowa state officials, including Governor Ray, 
who wrote letters petitioning the FRA to support the application. 
Conceivably to help shepherd the loan application through the 
federal bureaucracy, in October 1974 the Rock Island board of 
directors hired John W. Ingram, former head of the FRA, as the 
railroad’s new president. Ingram, a railroad marketing expert, 
changed the Rock Island’s image to a blue-and-white color scheme 
and bold R trademark, with “The Rock” replacing the old beaver 
pelt Rock Island emblem and its vermillion-and-yellow color 
scheme. But neither the change in executives nor the new image 
led the FRA to approve the loan. Instead, laughably, the railroad 
received $9.1 million from the FRA in February 1975, which 
Ingram told the government would have allowed the railroad to 
operate through March. With no other recourse, on March 17, 
1975, the Rock Island board filed for bankruptcy in Chicago. 
 The bankruptcy judge, Frank McGarr, appointed a single 
trustee to lead the railroad through reorganization. At the end of 
March, McGarr chose his former law partner William Gibbons, 
who knew nothing about railroads (but a lot about corporate 
bankruptcy law). Gibbons kept Ingram on as president of the 
line. Gibbons resisted arguments being raised by rival railroad 
executives, such as the Chicago and North Western Railway’s 
Larry Provo, that the Rock Island be liquidated; he also spurned 
the Rock’s main bondholder, Henry Crown, who wanted to 
liquidate the property. Instead, Gibbons, in an effort to save the 
railroad, sought the assistance of Iowa and other states for track 
rehabilitation.  
 Fearing the possible liquidation of the Rock Island in March 
1975, Iowa DOT officials Maurice Van Nostrand and John Mill-
hone wrote a memo about the railroad and its impact on Iowa’s 
economy. Summarizing the railroad’s significance in the state, 
they wrote, “The Rock Island has 1,960 miles of track in Iowa, 
runs 58 trains within the state daily. The railroad’s payroll in the 
state is $26 million. It pays taxes in Iowa of $1.5 million annually. 
There are 1,090 firms employing 39,000 Iowans which rely upon 
the Rock Island for transportation. There are 125 communities 
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which rely on the Rock Island as their only source of rail trans-
portation.”13  
 Iowa officials seized on the Rock’s bankruptcy to petition 
federal officials about the state’s vital interest in keeping the rail-
road operating. Van Nostrand and Millhone described three pos-
sibilities: “1) the continued operation of the Rock Island through 
the injection of financial assistance; 2) a merger of the Rock Island 
with the Union Pacific; and 3) dismemberment of the Rock Island 
with different lines assigned to other railroads.” The memo went 
over the competing arguments, dismissing the first two because 
of the FRA’s refusal to grant a loan to the railroad and the second 
because of the UP’s unwillingness to move forward on the mer-
ger. The third alternative was called the Provo alternative, 
named after Chicago and North Western Railway president 
Larry Provo, who told a Senate Commerce Committee hearing in 
Washington on March 10, 1975, that the Rock Island should be 
liquidated. Van Nostrand and Millhone recommended instead 
that the state intervene in the bankruptcy case to ascertain 
whether the railroad could survive and to testify “in the hearings 
before the ICC to seek the strongest possible protection for Iowa 
shippers.” “At a minimum,” they concluded, “we intend to ask 
that some rail service be provided on all the Rock Island lines for 
at least two months.”14 
 The State of Iowa and its Republican governor, Robert Ray, 
were more than happy to oblige the trustee of the Rock Island, as 
well as other railroads interested in a public-private partnership 
to preserve branch lines in the state. Given the need to rehabili-
tate lines to deliver commodities such as corn and wheat to Gulf 
of Mexico ports, the Rock’s management did not hesitate to pur-
sue rehabilitation efforts with the state and worked in partner-
ship with the state and shippers to do so. 
 
DESPITE the miserable condition of its finances and infrastruc-
ture in the mid-1970s, the Rock Island recognized earlier than 
most railroads the asset it possessed in the grain branches in the 
13. Maurice Van Nostrand and John Millhone, “Rock Island Railroad,” to Mem-
bers of Energy Policy Council, n.d. [March 1975], box 204, Ray Papers. 
14. Ibid., 3–4. 
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northwestern corner of the state. Gathering commodities in jum-
bo hopper cars, an innovation coming to take the place of boxcar 
loading of grain and corn, led the Rock Island, as early as 1967, 
to promote unit grain trains (trains dedicated to shipping a single 
commodity) to haul wheat and corn to the Gulf of Mexico. The 
Rock Island possessed the longest north–south line of any rail-
road, stretching from St. Paul, Minnesota, to Kansas City, Mis-
souri (what was called the spine line), and from there to Hering-
ton, Kansas, and south to Galveston, Texas.  
 Rock Island President Jervis Langdon promoted the unit 
trains in literature the railroad distributed throughout its terri-
tory. Titled “You Are Witnessing the Birth of a Market,” the pam-
phlet described how the Rock received a tariff rate allowing it 
to link midwestern states with Gulf ports for exporting grain to 
Japan, West Germany, and other destinations. The pamphlet 
claimed that shipments of wheat “zoomed upward from 
8,590,000 bushels in 1967 to 41,600,000 bushels in 1968.”15 That 
affected the Rock Island’s bottom line substantially and contrib-
uted to an increase of revenue. (Although the railroad still lost $4 
million in 1968, that was far better than its $12 million deficit in 
1967.) As many as six or seven Rock Island diesel locomotives 
pulled trains of more than one hundred hopper cars through the 
Midwest during the autumn harvest season, contributing to a 
successful strategy to deal with the growing losses in the com-
pany’s balance sheet. 
 As Richard Nixon’s détente policy contributed to the strength-
ening of trade relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, Iowa farmers increasingly found export markets for sur-
plus corn and grain. By the late 1970s, however, surpluses be-
came a problem as energy shortages and bad track on the rail-
roads led to declining shipments and increased storage of corn.  
 Rock Island trustee William Gibbons solicited assistance from 
across the state of Iowa, traveling to meet with shippers who 
could help the Rock provide cars to its storage facilities and meet-
ing with state officials to discuss partnerships in the branch line 
rehabilitation program. Three major branches needed assistance  
15. Rock Island Railroad, “You Are Witnessing the Birth of a Market,” accession 
2068, box 9, Jervis Langdon Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, 
Delaware. 
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from the state: the line between the Rock Island’s main at Atlan-
tic, Iowa, north to Audubon; the eleven-mile branch from Indi-
anola to Carlisle in Warren County; and a 120-mile stretch of line 
between Iowa Falls and Superior in the north-central part of the 
state. All the lines met a cost-benefit threshold determined by the 
Rail Assistance Program, and each had important shippers who 
needed rail service and were willing to share the costs with state 
officials and the railroad. In preliminary discussions the state 
noted that the Rock’s finances were such that it could not expect 
to contribute anything to the costs of rehabilitation at the mo-
ment, with promises of payments coming in the future.  
 The 13-mile Carlisle–Indianola line served two major ship-
pers with a total tonnage of 2.1 million bushels of grain hauled 
each year in 600 covered hopper cars. But the new cars, heavier 
at 200,000 pounds than the old steel frame boxcars, had taken 
their toll on the track. At places, track speeds were barely 5 miles 
per hour, with an average of only 10 miles per hour. “The rail on 
 
Abandoned depot and track, Shell Rock, Iowa, on the Rock Island’s Bur-
lington–Minneapolis mainline (October 1980). Successor Iowa Northern 
Railroad restored service to Shell Rock from Nora Springs one year later 
and reopened the entire line between Cedar Rapids and Manly in 1982. The 
depot (ca. 1872) is no longer extant. 
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the branch line was 65 to 75 pound steel that is from 67 to 79 years 
old.” The ties were in bad shape and ballast consisted of cinders 
and dirt, leading, even at the slow speeds, to frequent derail-
ments. The cost of rehabilitating the branch was estimated to be 
$498,000, which was to be paid by the state and shippers. That 
sum would only return the branch operations to a consistent 10 
miles per hour, hardly a style of railroading to stir the purse 
strings of Wall Street investment bankers.16  
 And that was the main point of this innovative public-private 
partnership. If shippers wanted to keep rail service, they would 
have to join with the state to ensure its continuation. A group of 
shippers in western Iowa formed the Audubon–Atlantic Branch 
Line Improvement Association and loaned the Rock trustee 
$100,000 to upgrade service on the branch. The state provided 
more money with the goal of improving track speeds to 20 miles 
per hour on the 25-mile branch. Gibbons traveled to Atlantic to 
receive his check and to inaugurate the new service.17 Rock exec-
utives set a goal of moving 1,000 carloads of grain annually over 
the branch by 1976, but that goal was never achieved. Rock Is-
land traffic manager Richard Lane reported in 1977 that the rail-
road had moved only 327 cars for the year, “almost exactly the 
same number as we moved in 1975.” With close to $750,000 spent 
on the upgrades to the line, the results were unimpressive to say 
the least.18 
“THANKS in large part to help from the State of Iowa and from 
Iowa shippers, the Rock Island seems to be making a go of it.” So 
read a wildly optimistic editorial in the Des Moines Register fo-
cused on “the apparent revival of the Rock Island.”19 Despite de-
cent quarterly reports made by Gibbons and his attorney, Nich-
olas Manos, at six-month status hearings on the Rock Island 
bankruptcy, the railroad still hemorrhaged cash, and attorneys 
16. Energy Policy Council Railroad Report, August 1974, folder 5 (Energy Policy 
Council), box 173 (Vermeer), Ray Papers. 
17. “Working on the Railroad,” Des Moines Register, 10/14/1975, clipping file,
Iowa State Department of Transportation Library (hereafter cited as IDOT), Ames. 
18. Schneider, Rock Island Requiem, 188.
19. “Rock Island Revival,” Des Moines Register, 10/17/1977, clipping file, IDOT.
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for Rock Island bondholder Henry Crown still urged the Rock’s 
liquidation.  
 So did rival railroads, most acutely the Chicago and North 
Western (CNW) and its president, Larry Provo. Provo took a dim 
view of the entire Iowa effort to rehabilitate branch lines. To the 
initial state proposal to upgrade a branch at Roland, near the main 
line at Nevada, Iowa, for $700,000, Provo responded, “Surely, 
if this line were not there we do not believe that anyone would 
seriously consider making an investment to construct the line to-
day.” Provo argued that there were not enough cars shipped to 
justify the expense and urged instead that the State of Iowa sup-
port a petition to abandon the line. Believing that the shipment 
of grain from small cooperatives had come to an end, Provo 
sought the abandonment of close to 1,500 miles of branch lines in 
the state. “The small country grain elevators,” he predicted, “will 
have a different function. They will become intermediate points 
between farmers and larger grain elevators.”20  
 The CNW had pursued a different strategy, relying less on 
collecting grain from branch lines and focusing instead on being 
the main railroad hauling Union Pacific freight eastbound to Chi-
cago. Before the Union Pacific–Rock Island merger had been jet-
tisoned, UP President John Kenefick had begun a relationship 
with Provo, culminating in having UP trains running over CNW 
tracks from Fremont, Nebraska, to Chicago. The CNW had al-
ways been the UP’s biggest exchange partner for freight in the 
Omaha area (an issue that complicated the UP’s efforts to merge 
with the Rock Island, as CNW chairman Ben Heineman inter-
vened against the merger and got what he wanted—a prolonged 
fight within the ICC). But now, with the Rock Island in disrepair 
and lacking the financial capital to rebuild its main lines, Kene-
fick renewed the connection with the CNW. In 1978, adding fuel 
to the fire, the Federal Railroad Administration provided a $100 
million loan to the CNW to rehabilitate its Clinton-to-Council 
Bluffs mainline.21 Given that situation, as well as the CNW’s 
20. Larry Provo to John Millhone, 3/31/1975, folder 7 (Energy Policy Council,
1975), box 173, Ray Papers; Dan Piller, “Railway Chief’s Blunt Talk Wins Few 
Friends in Iowa,” Des Moines Register, 3/15/1976, clipping file, IDOT. 
21. Hofsommer, Steel Trails to Hawkeyeland, 237; H. Roger Grant, The North West-
ern: A History of the Chicago & North Western Railway System (DeKalb, IL, 1966), 222. 
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access to the Powder River coal fields in Wyoming and lucrative 
shipments of coal over the UP to Chicago, Provo remained hos-
tile to Iowa’s approach to rehabilitating marginal branch lines. 
 
 STATE AID to the Rock Island could not restore profitability to 
the bankrupt railroad. In the wake of three successive brutal win-
ters in 1977, 1978, and 1979, followed by spring flooding and 
washouts throughout its operating territory, the railroad was 
nearing an impasse in the reorganization proceedings. Then, on 
August 28, 1979, the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks 
(BRAC), joined by the United Transportation Union (UTU), 
struck the railroad. For five weeks, management teams operated 
a sparse number of trains over less than 20 percent of the prop-
erty, with the great majority of the Rock Island idled by the strike. 
In the court bankruptcy proceedings, attorneys and the Rock 
trustee argued over whether the railroad had sufficient cash to 
operate. Determining that it did not, on September 24, 1979, the 
ICC ordered other railroads to provide directed service over the 
property after BRAC ignored President Jimmy Carter’s order to 
return to work. The crews slowly came back to their jobs, but the 
railroad they returned to was no longer the Rock Island—rather 
it was operated by Kansas City Terminal Railroad management 
using Rock Island crews. Other railroads, like the CNW, the Bur-
lington Northern, and the Milwaukee Road, also operated on 
Rock Island tracks in Iowa under the directed service order, 
their losses subsidized by federal taxpayers.22 
 On January 25, 1980, citing the failure of the trustee to show 
how a reorganized core property could restore profitability to the 
railroad sufficient to pay the substantial debt the railroad now 
owed creditors (over $400 million), Judge Frank McGarr decided 
that the property should be liquidated, culminating in an order 
to embargo shipments on the property after March 24 and aim-
ing for a total cessation of operations on the railroad by March  
31, 1980. Other lines had been liquidated in the past, but nothing 
compared to the scale and scope of the Rock Island’s 7,000-mile 
system being liquidated. The Rock Island would be (and re-
mains) the largest liquidation of a railroad in history. 
22. Schneider, Rock Island Requiem, 227–31. 
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IOWANS were deeply concerned about the Rock Island’s failure, 
especially about how it would affect the state’s economy and rail-
road service in the state.23 As a potential long-term solution, in 
1980 the state legislature created the Iowa Railway Finance Au-
thority (IRFA) to provide for the financing of essential railroad 
lines and their rehabilitation under a grant program established 
by the legislature. The Ray administration and the legislature 
continued to seek innovative ways to keep rail lines in service in 
difficult times for the industry.24  
 For the short term, Iowa policymakers sought continued op-
eration under extended ICC-directed service operations. Other 
railroads, primarily the CNW, had operated on Rock Island track. 
23. The Des Moines Register ran banner headlines, akin to REMEMBER THE 
MAINE, announcing the end of the Rock Island.  
24. The IRFA is still in operation; its grant funds continue to provide assistance 
to Iowa railroads. Its 2008 annual report is available at http://publications.iowa 
.gov/6892/1/IRFA_Annual__Report_2008.pdf (accessed 12/15/2013). 
 
An original Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Minnesota station, built in 1871 
at Greene, Iowa (October 1978). With the depot threatened by demolition 
in 1987, the town raised the money necessary to move it to a new site near 
the Greene Historical Museum. 
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The CNW operated over the spine line between the Iowa-Minne-
sota border to the south through Des Moines, paying the Rock 
Island estate over $1 million per month to do so. It also operated 
over the grain branches in the northwest corner of the state. The 
Burlington Northern Railroad and the Milwaukee Road also op-
erated on the Rock Island’s lines. The shutdown of the railroad 
on March 31, 1980, threatened shippers with a loss of railroad ser-
vice. After the shutdown, as a way to provide continued rail ser-
vice to vital shippers, the trustee negotiated rentals of properties 
to railroads that had operated under directed service. 
 In the short run, that solved the problem of continued service 
on Iowa lines. It was no long-term solution, however. If Rock   
Island trustee Gibbons could not find buyers for the rail proper-
ties in the state, then service would end, leaving shippers in the 
lurch. Governor Ray, IDOT, and the state legislature wanted to 
assure shippers that rail service would continue even if no poten-
tial buyers could be found to operate on former Rock lines.  
 One of the alternatives that was least popular among IDOT 
staff was to grant the CNW control over former Rock Island and 
Milwaukee Road branches. The CNW had strongly opposed the 
Iowa branch line improvement project, drawing the ire of some 
state officials and many shippers, who saw its service as poor and 
feared that it would dominate Iowa’s rail network after the Rock 
Island’s demise. IDOT Director Raymond Kassel pointed to a 
shipper survey produced by the Iowa Railway Finance Author-
ity as evidence that the CNW was ill-equipped to provide effec-
tive service over former Rock Island lines. According to Kassel, 
shippers had complained about “deferred maintenance, track 
conditions, lack of motive power, failure to pull loaded trains, 
poor turn-around time for trains, failure to make car payments 
due to shippers for their equipment, and excessive delays north 
of Kansas City.” Train turn-around time, according to shippers, 
was taking 15–30 days, compared to 12–15 days when the Kansas 
City Terminal ran the Rock under directed service.25 Kassel and 
others in state government favored the sale of many of the former 
25. Raymond Kassel to Donald Yaden, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
10/3/1980, box 204 (Vermeer), Ray Papers. 
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Rock Island lines to the Kansas City Southern Railroad, a com-
pany without a presence in Iowa, in order to ensure rail compe-
tition in the state. 
 James Wolfe, president and CEO of the CNW, responded 
harshly to Kassel’s proposal. “Your continuing attempts to try to 
bring in a new carrier into the State of Iowa to replace the now-
defunct Rock Island will do nothing but prolong the agonies 
which your constituency faced in the past, the burden on Iowa of 
too many unprofitable railroad companies.” Wolfe defended the 
CNW’s record, bragging that “the efforts being made by our em-
ployees in your State [are] no less than Herculean. On an an-
nualized basis, the employees of the North Western have already 
moved 20 percent more grain than moved in 1978. By the end of 
the year [1980], we expect to move over 350 million bushels of  
grain, exceeding the combined North Western–Rock Island ef-
forts in 1978 by over 30 percent.”26 In sum, Wolfe argued for the 
continued control of former Rock Island lines in the state by the 
CNW rather than a new carrier. 
 The man in control of the disposition of Rock Island assets 
was William Gibbons. Working with a much reduced staff and 
still directed by Judge Frank McGarr and the U.S. District Court 
in Chicago, he would negotiate to dispose of lines to other rail-
roads, interested state governments, and shippers. Gibbons 
proved to be a hard bargainer, seeking to maximize returns on 
the railroad’s assets in order to gain the most capital to reorganize 
the company. 
 Delaying the sale of assets was the Rock Island Employee 
Transition Act, written by Kansas Republican Senator Nancy 
Kassebaum and signed into law by President Jimmy Carter. It 
ensured that former Rock Island employees would receive back 
pay and vacation pay totaling $75 million paid from the Rock’s 
estate. Judge McGarr placed an injunction on the law—claiming 
that labor had already been paid for five years when the railroad 
was in bankruptcy and that the law represented an unfair taking 
of property from the estate to pay workers for a railroad that no 
longer operated. The Railway Labor Executives’ Association pe-
titioned the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to lift the injunction, 
26. James Wolfe to Raymond Kassel, 10/17/1980, box 204 (Vermeer), Ray Papers. 
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but it was upheld in a decision written by Supreme Court Justice 
John Paul Stephens. After a year of wrangling, the case, Railway 
Labor Executives’ Association v. Gibbons, came before the U.S. Su-
preme Court, which unanimously decided that the Rock Island 
owed no obligations to workers from its estate as the law violated 
the U.S. Constitution’s uniform standard of bankruptcy clause 
(in that no other bankrupt railroad was being required to pay 
labor from the assets of its own estate). With that decision an-
nounced in March 1982, the Rock’s reorganization hit high gear, 
and line sales began to materialize.27 
THE STATE OF IOWA, like most midwestern states affected 
by the Rock’s liquidation, feared that the trustee was delaying 
line sales and forcing states to pay too much for track in the hope 
that the government could find an operator. At a Midwest Gov-
ernors’ Conference held on March 4, 1982, in Oklahoma City, 
Gibbons defended the prices he was asking for lines in Okla-
homa and other states based on the salvage price for the rail and 
other equipment. He also showed how many sales had been ne-
gotiated. There had been only two leases and sales in Iowa (a 
seven-mile segment to the Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railroad 
and a four-mile segment to the Keokuk Junction Railroad).28 In 
some cases, the process worked out badly for the public interest. 
The Choctaw Route, linking Memphis, Tennessee, to Tucumcari, 
New Mexico, for example, was almost entirely abandoned except 
for small line segments sold to short-line operators. In other 
cases, such as the sale of the Rock Island’s line from Tucumcari, 
New Mexico, to St. Louis, Missouri, to the Southern Pacific Rail-
road for $57 million, the process worked well for reestablishing 
service on essential lines.  
 States like Kansas were incensed by the slow process, and 
U.S. Senator Bob Dole threatened an investigation of Gibbons.29 
27. Schneider, Rock Island Requiem, 277–80.
28. William Gibbons, remarks to Midwest Governors’ Conference, Oklahoma
City, 3/4/1982, box 239, Ray Papers. 
29. Bob Dole to Frank McGarr, 10/7/1981, and Gibbons’s reply, 10/15/1981, in 
folder 1, box 5, Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Papers, Western His-
tory Collection, University of Oklahoma Library, Norman, Oklahoma. 
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Kansas Governor John Carlin even called for total liquidation if 
sales continued to be delayed. Ray responded that the State of 
Iowa was considering purchasing the Rock Island from the trus-
tee. “It would be a tragedy if portions of the Rock Island were 
liquidated prior to the time when the state can act to save them. 
. . . I do share your frustration at the slow pace with which the 
Trustee is moving to dispose of Rock Island property,” but “I am 
reluctant to support a call for immediate liquidation at this time.”30 
 Governor Ray feared that the trustee would hold out for ex-
orbitant prices in Iowa. The Rock Island’s main east–west line 
across the state was dormant, and some feared that it would be 
abandoned and sold for scrap. To ensure that vital lines were not 
lost for rail service, the IRFA and IDOT, in cooperation with Ray, 
proposed purchasing “essential Rock Island trackage.” An IDOT 
report from April 1981 stressed that “a total loss of service on 
30. Robert Ray to John Carlin, 7/17/1981, box 239 (Wilson), Ray Papers. In the 
bankruptcy hearing, the State of Kansas represented all midwestern states as 
intervener in the case. 
 
Abandoned depot and track, Oskaloosa, Iowa, photographed four months 
after the Rock Island had shut down (July 1980). The depot, built in 1887–
88, was added to the National Register in 1990 and has been restored and 
reused as a restaurant. The tracks have been removed. 
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essential Rock Island trackage in Iowa could cost Iowa’s econ-
omy hundreds of millions of dollars per year in additional trans-
portation costs, and additional highway system wear. Thou-
sands of railroad and non-railroad jobs could be lost.” “In north-
west Iowa alone, the impact of continued rail service . . . exceeds 
$15 million annually.”  
ON THE OTHER HAND, the projected cost of purchasing “core 
Rock Island” track in the state (about 1,400 miles) was $65–$118 
million, with track rehabilitation estimated to cost an additional 
$97 million. How would such an expense be paid for? IDOT 
proposed a railroad diesel fuel tax of one cent per gallon, which 
could raise an estimated $10–15 million per year. Other proposals 
included a property tax on railroads and the collection of delin-
quent taxes (the Rock Island and Milwaukee Road, both in bank-
ruptcy, owed approximately $4–5 million to state coffers). Other 
financing could come from the issuance of state bonds, and oper-
ators would share start-up costs and qualify for rehabilitation aid 
from the assessed taxes on the railroads themselves.31 The goal 
was to form a limited partnership that would help maintain and 
operate essential Rock Island track in the state.  
 The proposal, which would have been an expensive proposi-
tion for Iowa, drew opposition from state legislators, such as 
State Senator Dick Drake (R-Muscatine), who favored a different 
approach to the problem. Drake asked 18 questions about the 
proposal. Much of his concern centered on the idea of a limited 
partnership and on the accumulation of debt from bonds that 
would accrue to state taxpayers.  
 The proposed diesel fuel tax also raised concerns. C. Philip 
Baumel, a professor of agriculture and transportation expert at 
Iowa State University, argued that the diesel fuel tax might lead 
railroads to cut back service as the fuel tax caused their costs to 
rise. It might also lead to higher truck use on the roads, resulting 
in higher highway maintenance costs for the state.32 
31. Doug Gross, Memo to Governor Ray, 4/23/1981, with attachment, “State
Involvement of Essential Rock Island Trackage,” box 33 (Gross), Ray Papers. 
32. Doug Gross, Memo to Governor Ray, 5/16/1981, box 33 (Gross), Ray Papers.
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 Although the plan was opposed by some railroads, such as 
the CNW, which called the plan “socialistic,” other railroads re-
moved their opposition. The Milwaukee Road, which hoped to 
gain trackage rights over the north–south spine line, dropped its 
opposition in May 1981. The Burlington Northern also saw the 
state’s plan as a feasible way to handle the disposition of lines. 
The stumbling block remained the CNW, which intended to pur-
chase the north–south spine line from the Rock estate. Besides 
worrying about the lack of competition if the CNW should suc-
ceed in gaining control of that line, state officials also worried 
that if the CNW was able to purchase the spine line from the Rock 
estate, the State of Iowa would be “left with the dog lines—and 
those lines would probably result in the state being unable to at-
tract general partners and may result in the state being unable to 
divest itself of the lines in the future.”33 
33. Doug Gross, Memo to Governor Ray, 6/8/1981, box 33 (Gross), Ray Papers. 
The state of Minnesota, which was also concerned about the line being sold to 
Abandoned depot and platforms, West Liberty, Iowa (May 1983). Freight 
service had resumed on the defunct Rock Island’s former east–west main-
line through West Liberty when this photo was made, but the depot and 
platforms remained abandoned and unneeded. Today the depot has been 
restored as a museum and houses West Liberty’s Chamber of Commerce. 
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 Ultimately, the Iowa General Assembly passed a modified 
limited partnership plan (House File 874), which authorized the 
IRFA “to participate in limited partnerships and create a special 
railroad facility fund to retire bonds.” The diesel fuel tax was 
kept in the bill, with the IRFA managing the fund and the tax 
collected, which was estimated to be worth $1–$3 million. Claims 
that the plan was socialistic were challenged by the railroads, 
which asserted that the state’s sole responsibility under the law 
would be to collect the diesel fuel tax and that the state was not 
liable for the venture under the limited partnership approach. 
IDOT was concerned, however, that the scaled-down plan would 
not be enough to “develop a system of financing which will make 
it in the private sector’s economic self-interest to become in-
volved in providing continued, competitive and improved rail 
freight service in Iowa.” There was also concern that a scaled-
down version would only purchase bits and pieces of the former 
Rock Island and not the entire system, making it more difficult 
to sell “unconnected segments.” That, in turn, would make it dif-
ficult to achieve a prosperous, or even viable, rail network.34 
 The legislature passed the original bill in August 1981, allow-
ing for the excise tax on diesel fuel, with the IRFA to manage the 
fund for the purposes of “providing for the financing of railway 
facilities and enhancing the continued operation of railroad facili-
ties.” The tax was to go into effect on October 1, 1981, but seven 
railroads in the state, including the Santa Fe, CNW, Milwaukee 
Road, Union Pacific, and others, joined by the intervening Iowa 
Railroad Shippers Company, filed a petition in equity in Novem-
ber 1981 seeking a delay on the collection of the tax. A temporary 
injunction was granted on December 28, 1981. After the trial court 
in Polk County upheld the tax, the railroads appealed on three 
grounds: discrimination against the railroads in violation of Sec-
tion 11503 of U.S. Code 49; violation of the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, whereby surviving railroads were burdened 
the CNW, produced a lengthy report on the spine line. Planning Division, Min-
nesota Department of Transportation, The Minnesota North/South Rail Corridor: 
A Study of the Alternatives for Mainline Route and Local Service Needs (Minneapolis, 
1981), available in IDOT, Ames, Iowa. 
34. IDOT, “A Discussion of Rail Finance Proposals,” 8/11/1981, box 38 (Gross), 
Ray Papers. 
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with a tax to pay for the abandoned lines of railroads that no 
longer operated; and violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution in that the revenue from the tax would not benefit 
them, but rather potential competitors who took over abandoned 
lines. In 1983 the Iowa State Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision sided 
with the plaintiffs on their charge that the diesel fuel tax violated 
Section 11503 of U.S. Code 49, in that the railroads were unfairly 
taxed, unlike other transportation services in the state.35 
BY THE TIME the Iowa Supreme Court ruled on the case, the 
CNW had purchased the spine line from the Rock Island trustee 
for $93 million, following a lengthy bidding war between the 
CNW and the Soo Line Railroad, which wanted to gain access to 
Kansas City. The state of Iowa took no position on either railroad, 
only wanting to ensure trackage rights for other railroads no 
matter who won the bid. In the Chicago District Court, Judge 
McGarr entertained the competing bids. The CNW initially bid 
$76 million for the property. The Soo Line upped the bidding to 
$95 million, but, given the lateness of its bid and fears that Soo 
Line financing would fall through, the sale of the line to the CNW 
was approved in June 1983 after the CNW increased its offer to 
$93 million. (The Soo Line had upped its bid to $100 million, but 
attorneys for the ICC and the Justice Department convinced 
McGarr that the CNW bid was the more legitimate one.)36 
 One of the last major line sales of former Rock Island prop-
erty in Iowa was to Heartland Rail Corporation, a Des Moines 
company that had been formed the previous year as TRAIN and 
for a while had been negotiating with the trustee to purchase the 
former Rock Island east–west mainline. The trustee sought $81 
million for the property, which would encompass the section 
of the main line from Council Bluffs, Iowa, to Bureau Junction, 
Illinois. (The trustee had leased the main line from Chicago to 
Bureau Junction to CSX Corporation and had sold the line from 
Chicago to Joliet, Illinois, to the Regional Transportation Au-
thority, a commuter operator now known as Metra.) The amount 
35. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway et al. v. Gerald D. Bair et al., Supreme
Court of Iowa, 264/69397, from Iowa Tax Research Library at http:// 
itrl.idr.iowa.gov/mx/hm.asp?id=14CF, accessed 12/21/2013. 
36. Schneider, Rock Island Requiem, 285–87.
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Gibbons requested was far too high for a line that would need 
serious upgrading and new signals on its route. Many sections of 
the line had not seen regular train service since the end of di-
rected service over the Rock Island in 1980. The Iowa Railroad 
had operated over portions of the line between Council Bluffs 
and Adair, and later to Bureau Junction, but, with the absence 
of regular service in central Iowa, the track and property had 
decayed.  
 After lengthy negotiations and a loan of $15 million from the 
IRFA, Heartland purchased the property for $31.5 million in Feb-
ruary 1984 and began operations over the line a few months later, 
contracting with Iowa Interstate Railroad Company to do so. 
Early operations were difficult, and the railroad depended heavily 
on support from the IRFA for its first decade of operations, but 
with the ethanol fuel boom and good management, Iowa Inter-
state began to turn around its fortunes and became a well-
respected and profitable operation over the former Rock Island. 
Other shortlines in the state, such as the Iowa Northern Railroad, 
also profited on former Rock Island rails as a result of the limited 
partnership with the IRFA.37 
 
THE STATE OF IOWA had pursued a policy designed to save 
essential branch line trackage in the state in the mid-1970s. By the 
late 1980s, many of the branches it had sought to save, including 
the Rock Island’s line from Indianola to Carlisle (now a nature 
trail) and the line from Atlantic to Audubon (abandoned almost 
entirely by Iowa Interstate in the early 2000s), had lost online 
traffic to trucks or had shippers close their doors permanently in 
the new postindustrial economy. Many more branches continue 
in operation as a result of the foresight of Iowa public officials 
and the investments made in rail service in the state, including 
the key northwest branch lines, which were operated first by the 
CNW and then by the Union Pacific. 
 The state’s decision to fund the rehabilitation of other key 
routes in the state, such as the Iowa Interstate and Iowa Northern 
37. Schneider, Rock Island Requiem, 287–89; William Petroski, “Fledgling Heart-
land Rail Sets Out to Prove its Critics Wrong,” Des Moines Register, 11/4/1982; 
Fred W. Frailey, “The Iowa Interstate Story,” Trains (June 2011), 31–37. 
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mainlines, continues to reap benefits for the state and for shippers 
dependent on reliable rail service. Not every rail line could be 
saved; abandonments dominated the news in Iowa during the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Yet the decisions made by 
Governor Ray, IDOT policymakers, and state legislators created 
an innovative and effective public program that saved not only a 
piece of the Rock but also other vital elements of the railroad net-
work in the Hawkeye state. 
